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COMMENTS
THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN A
CASE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURIS-
DICTION OR FOR IMPROPER VENUE
When an action is initially brought in a state or federal court and is dis-
missed for lack of proper venue or jurisdiction, it frequently becomes neces-
sary to determine whether the applicable statute of limitations has been tolled
,during the pendency of the action. If a second action is instituted after the
"statute has run, the action will be considered time-barred in the absence of a
tolling doctrine.
It is a general rule of law in the various states that, in the absence of a
statute, the reinstitution of a suit or action during the pendency of which
the applicable statute of limitations has run is not permitted but is consid-
ered time-barred.' Most states have passed statutes that, under certain circum-
stances, purport to give a plaintiff additional time to bring a second action.2
These so-called "saving" statutes vary in language and court interpretatibn,
but a majority of states have held such statutes applicable when the first
action has been dismissed for lack of venue, personal jurisdiction, or subject
matter jurisdiction. 3 Some of the statutes simply provide additional time in
all cases where a decision has not been reached on the merits in the first
action.4
I. THE VIRGINrA LAW
Virginia's "saving" statute, Code § 8-34,5 gives a plaintiff an extra year
in which to bring a second action when the first action abates for any'of
four specified reasons,0 but makes no mention of actions or suits dismissed
for lack of proper venue or jurisdiction. § 8-34 was judicially construed by
the Virginia Supreme Court in Jones v. Morris Plan Bank,7 where the plain-
'See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1043, 1046 (1966); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions
§ 287 (1948).2 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 431-32 n.9 (1965) (this case lisis 'a
number of such state statutes); Annot., 6 AJL.R.3d 1043, 1046 (1966).
3 See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1043, 1047-49, 1053, 1062-68 (1966).
4 Id. at 1062-68.
5 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-34 (1957).
6 The statute provides that an additional year will be given if the action or suit abates
(1) by the return of no inhabitant or (2) by the death or marriage of either party or
(3) if a judgement or decree for the plaintiff is arrested or reversed upon a ground that
does not preclude a new action or suit for the same cause or (4) if there be reason to
bring a new suit or action by reason of the loss or destruction of any of the papers or
records in a former suit. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-34 (1957).
7170 Va. 88, 195 SE. 525 (1938).
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tiff, his first action dismissed for improper venue, reinstituted his action
in a court of proper venue after the statute of limitations had run. The court
first enunciated the general rule that there is no tolling of a statute during
the pendency of a case in the absence of a statute.8 Soundly relying on legis-
lative history 9 and, by analogy, on the Death By Wrongful Act section,10
the court strictly construed" § 8-34, holding it inapplicable to the present
situation.
There is no saving provision where a suit, such as that of the plaintiff
here, was brought in the wrong forum or was dismissed otherwise than
upon the merits. 12
While Jones specifically dealt with improper venue and not jurisdiction,
the court's reasoning clearly demonstrates that § 8-34 does not apply in
either case. Furthermore, an earlier Virginia case held that the statute of
limitations is not tolled when jurisdiction is lacking.' 3
Since Jones, relatively few Virginia cases have dealt with the general
problem of tolling and the construction of § 8-34- These cases do reflect a
more liberal attitude on behalf of the court with respect to tolling statutes
of limitation,' 4 although at no time has the court altered the essential hold-
81d. at 91, 195 S.E. at 526. See Manuel, v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 99 Va. 188, 37 S.E. 957
(1901); Dawes v. New York Phila. & Norf. R.R., 96 Va. 733, 32 S.E. 778 (1899).
9 The court noted that the forerunner of § 8-34 had used language that specifically
tolled the statute of limitations in a case where the plaintiff proceeded in the wrong
forum. The revisors of the Code of 1919 eliminated this provision, deeming it unwise.
170 Va. at 93-94, 195 SE. at 527.
'OVA. CoDE ANN. § 8-634 (Supp. 1972) provides that in actions for wrongful death
the two year statute of limitations will be tolled during the pendency of the action if
the action abates or is dismissed for any cause without a determination of the merits.
Under this section, it is clear that a dismissal for lack of proper venue or jurisdiction
would toll the statute, because there would have been no determination on the merits.
The court properly felt that the legislature would have used similar language in § 8-34
if it had intended such a result. Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 170 Va. 88, 93, 195 SE. 525,
527 (1938).
" The court held that a statute of limitations would be tolled only for one of the
four reasons specified in the statute (see note 6 supra). Id. at 92, 195 SE. at 526.
12 Id. at 93, 195 SE. at 527.
Is Callis v. Waddy, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 511 (1811).
14 See generally Woodson v. Commonwealth Util., Inc., 209 Va. 72, 161 SE.2d 669
(1968) (a decree declaring a confessed judgement void was held to bring plaintiff within
that provision of § 8-34 dealing with a judgement arrested or reversed on a ground not
precluding a new action; the court said that § 8-34 was remedial and should be liberally
construed); Norwood v. Buffey, 196 Va. 1051, 86 SE.2d 809 (1955) (the court gave a
liberal interpretation to § 8-634, dealing with wrongful death); Street v. Consumers
Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575, 39 SE.2d 271, 277 (1946) (the court said that the pur-
pose of a statute of limitations is to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from being
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ing of Jones-that § 8-34 applies only to cases that fall within one of the
four enumerated provisions of the section. 15
One case, Weinstein v. Glen Falls Insurance Co.,16 deserves special men-
tion. Plaintiff's initial action at law on an insurance contract was dismissed
because the contract needed reformation. Before dismissal, and after the
contractual limitation had run, plaintiff filed a suit in equity in the same
court to accomplish this purpose. The court treated the equity suit as a
continuation of the law action and held that the contractual limitation did
not bar the suit.'7 At least one federal case has suggested that Jones may no
longer be good law in light of WeinStein, 8 although Weinstein mentioned
neither Jones nor § 8-34 in reaching its decision. It would seem that the
holding of the later case would thus be limited to the special facts involved:
1) the law and equity sides of the same case, and 2) a case in which the
second suit is brought before dismissal of the first and in the same court.19
It must therefore be concluded that § 8-34 does not apply to suits or
actions dismissed for improper venue or lack of jurisdiction. A plaintiff in
such a case, who files his second suit or action after the applicable statute
of limitations has run, will be vulnerable to such a defense.
II. T-HE FEDERAL LAW
In many cases the second action will be brought in a federal court, and it
will have to decide whether the statute of limitations was tolled during the
pendency of the action in the first case, which may have been in either a
state or federal court. The question is complicated by the fact that the
federal court must first determine whether to apply federal law, as op-
posed to state law, and then decide what the federal tolling law is. Of course,
if the court decides to apply Virginia law, the results will be the same as
noted above.
A. Federal Question Cases
The leading case regarding a federal question and federal statute of limi-
tations, with respect to tolling, is Burnett v. New York Central Railroad
Co.20 This case involved an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
asserted after a great lapse of time; to allow tolling in the venue and jurisdiction cases
would not appear inconsistent with this purpose).
15 See note 6 supra.
10 202 Va. 722, 119 S.E.2d 497 (1961).
17 Id. at 729-30, 119 S.E.2d at 503.
18 Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 531 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
932 (1971).
19 Even the Atkins court recognized the factual distinctions that set apart Weinstein
from cases such as Jones. 435 F.2d 527, at 535.
20 380 US. 424 (1965).
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Act that has its own three year statute of limitations. 2' Plaintiff's case was
originally brought in the state court of Ohio and dismissed for improper
venue. After the statute had run, plaintiff reinstituted his action in the fed-
eral court. The Supreme Court had little difficulty in applying federal toll-
ing law because of the presence of a federal question and federal statute
of limitations. The Court held that plaintiff's state court action had tolled
the federal limitation provision; therefore, his present action was timely. 22
The Court's reasoning was essentially threefold: 1) the purpose of the
statute of limitations was not violated by allowing plaintiff's claim because
he had not "slept on his rights" and his claim was not stale;2a 2) under the law
of most states, when improper venue exists, the court may transfer the case
to the state court of proper venue, thus eliminating the tolling problem;2 4
3) under federal law, an action brought in the wrong venue in a federal
court may be transferred to the proper court,25 and will be transferred if
the statute of limitations would otherwise bar the action.2 6 Therefore, the
Court concluded that the legislative intent of Congress was that the statute
of limitations should not bar an action dismissed for improper venue in a
state court.2 7 Thus, it may be concluded from Burnett that federal tolling
2145 U.S.C. § 56 et seq. (1970).
22 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426 (1965).
23 Id. at 428. The Court said that the purpose of statutes of limitations is to
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival 'of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared. Id.
The Court also noted that railroads had previously waived venue objections to allow
suits to proceed in state courts.
24 Id. at 431 n.8. The Court lists thirty-one states that have transfer-of-venue statutes.
When venue is transferred pursuant to such a statute, there is no need for a tolling
doctrine because the statute of limitations ceases to run from the moment the action
is properly commenced.
The Court lists VA. CODE ANN. § 8-157 (Supp. 1972) as a statute that permits a transfer
when there is improper venue. However, it has been held by the Virginia Supreme Court
that dismissal, not transfer, is the correct procedure in a case of improper venue. See
Woodhouse v. Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Co., 166 Va. 706, 185 SE. 876 (1936).
There are no cases to the contrary.
Burnett also cited § 8-34 as applying to cases in which there was a dismissal for im-
proper venue. Thus the Supreme Court misconstrued Virginia law on both points.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1970) which reads:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such
case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
26 See generally Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomsen, 218 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1955);
Gold v. Griffith, 190 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1960); Dennis v. Galvanek, 171 F. Supp.
115 (M.D. Pa. 1959); Schultz v. McAfee, 160 F. Supp. 210 (D.Maine 1958). In these
cases the courts have held that "the interest of justice" requires that the case be trans-
ferred.
27 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 432 (1965).
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law will apply when a federal question and federal statute of limitations are
involved, and that the federal law will toll the statute during the pendency
of a state court action subsequently dismissed for improper venue.
Neither Burnett nor other Supreme Court cases present the issue of
whether federal tolling law would apply to a case raising a federal question
but controlled by a state statute of limitations. However, the issue was pre-
sented to the Fifth Circuit in Mizell v. North Broward Hospital District.2 8
The court held that in cases arising under the laws or Constitution of the
United States, a federal rule on tolling a state statute of limitations should
be observed, if the rule clearly carries out the intent of Congress or of the
constitutional principle at stake.P Thus, the door has been opened to apply
federal tolling law in all federal question cases when to do so appears
equitable.
While the federal tolling law with respect to venue dismissals is now,
clearly established, the law with respect to dismissals for lack of jurisdiction
is in need of clarification. There are no Supreme Court cases directly on
point; however, the Burnett Court was always careful to point out that plain-
tiff's action had been brought in a state court of competent jurisdiction, and
that service of process on defendants had been proper.30 This language
suggests that tolling might not be appropriate under federal law when a,
prior case has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
Two federal cases have dealt with this question since the Burnett opinion.'
In Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.,-3 the district court held that the
applicable statute of limitations would not be tolled during the pendency
of a prior action that failed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. The court felt that the Burnett holding should be restricted to
narrow grounds 32 However, the impact of this decision is somewhat les-
sened by the fact that the court stressed certain other factors in reaching its.
conclusion.33
28 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970).
29 d. at 474. This case involved a suit by plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1981-83 (1970). The court felt that the purpose of theact was to encourage
the utilization of state procedures before requiring a plaintiff to bring his federal suit.
Therefore, the court felt that federal tolling should govern.
S30fBurnett v. New York Cent. R. Co, 380 U.S.'424, 429, 434-35 (1965). The Court's
conclusion was stated in these terms:
[wlhen a plaintiff begins a timely FELA action in a state court having jurisdic-
tion, and serves the defendant with proce- and plaintiff's case is dismissed for im-
proper venue, the FELA limitation is tolled during the pendency of the state suit.
Id. at 434-45.
3' 274 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 414 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1969).
32 274 F. Supp. at 411.
33 Plaintiff's action was brought from fifteen to thirty-nine months after the appli-
cable statutes had run. The court also noted that the plaintiff at any time could have
sued the defendant in his home district and obtained personal jurisdiction over him.
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In Berry v. Pacific Sportfishing, Inc.,3A the Ninth Circuit held that a prior
action in a state court did toll the statute of limitations although the state
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court noted the limiting lan-
guage of Burnett but avoided its impact by emphasizing two factors: (1)
defendant had never challenged the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
the state court, where the action was still pending,35 and (2) the state court
had "general" jurisdiction over the matter until such an assertion by the
defendant.86 This language indicates that the court might have ruled dif-
ferently had the first action been previously dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
With no other cases on point, the only safe conclusion is that the question
is still open in the federal courts. While Burnett suggests that there will be
no tolling in jurisdictional cases, strong policy arguments can be advanced
for treating jurisdiction and venue dismissals alike for the purpose of tolling.37
B. Diversity of Citizenship Cases
Since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins8 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,39
it has been well established that a state statute of limitations will be con-
trolling in federal courts when jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of
citizenship.40 Until the Fourth Circuit decided Atkins v. Schmutz Manu-
facturing Co.,41 all federal courts had applied state tolling law in such cases.42
34372 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1967).
35 Id. at 214-15.
36 ld. The court also pointed out that the state court had personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Whether such a result was necessary to the court's decision is a matter
of speculation.
3 7 It is probable that in most cases in which an action is dismissed for lack of proper
jurisdiction, the plaintiff has not slept on his rights or allowed his claim to grow stale.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Furthermore, in such cases the defendant is
never surprised by the action; he is put on notice that he may have to defend when
the initial action is filed and before the statute has run. Thus, it can be reasonably argued
that statute of limitations should be tolled in both venue and jurisdiction cases.
38 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court held that in diversity cases the federal courts must
apply the substantive law of the forum state rather than a federal common or general
law.
39 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Guaranty Trust held that in diversity cases a state statute of
limitations must be applied by the court, because such a statute is substantive and will
affect the outcome of the case in question. This "outcome determination" test has since
undergone some erosion. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc, 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Szantay v. Beach Aircraft Corp., 349
F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
40Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). No court in a diversity case has
ever failed to apply the applicable state statute of limitations.
41435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 932 (1971).
4 2 See Note, 71 COLUm. L. REv. 865, 874-75 (1971).
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However, the Atkins court was faced with 1) an unusual factual situation
that clearly cried out for tolling,43 and 2) Virginia law that would not permit
such a holding.4 Atkins held that under the law of Guaranty Trust Co. the
state limitation must be applied 4 5 but the court refused to go further and
follow state tolling law. The court concluded:
that the tolling effect of the pendency of an identical suit in another
federal court is to be determined as a matter of federal, rather than state
law... (emphasis added) .46
The constitutional justification for such a holding can be questioned 4 7 but
Atkins does represent the current law in the Fourth Circuit.
Atkins' chief significance lies in connection with an initial federal court
action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the Fourth Circuit federal toll-
ing law will apply, and it is at least possible that the court would consider
the statute of limitations to be tolled during the pendency of the first ac-
tion.48 Without Atkins, Virginia law would be controlling, and unques-
tionably the statute would not be tolled.49
43 Plaintiff Atkins initially brought his action in the federal courts of Kentucky for
personal injuries sustained in Virginia. (At that time Virginia had no long-arm statute.)
The action was brought within the Virginia two year statute of limitations but after the
expiration of Kentucky's one year statute. While the case was pending, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals reversed its previous position and held that in such cases Kentucky's
statute would apply rather than the statute of the place of the wrong. See Seat v.
Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc, 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1965). The district court
then dismissed the action as time-barred, and plaintiff, before the Sixth Circuit affirmed
this decision in Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co, 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cit. 1967), filed his
action in a federal court in Virginia. Virginia's two year statute had now run and the
district court dismissed the action, relying on Virginia tolling law. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed before deciding to rehear the case. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F.
Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968). The court in the present
case rather obviously felt that Atkins had been a victim of circumstance.
44The factual situation in Atkins does not fall within any of the provisions of § 8-34
as interpreted by Jones. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va.
1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).45 Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 538 n.48 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402
US. 932 (1971).
46 Id. at 527. Atkins considered tolling to be a procedural matter. Id. at 536.
47 For an excellent analysis of the constitutional justification for Atkins, see Note, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 865 (1971); Comment, 6 U. RIcH. L. REv. 360 (1972). Judge Winter
concurred with the majority holding in Atkins because he felt that the particular factual
situation was controlled by Weinstein (see text page 321 supra). However, Judge Winter
questioned the reasoning of the majority with respect to applying federal tolling law
to a state statute of limitations in diversity cases. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435
F.2d 527, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 932 (1971).48 See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
49Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
932 (1971).
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It is, of course, possible that the first action might have been brought.
in the state court, and upon dismissal, reinstituted in a federal court for rea-
sons of diversity. Such a factual situation is not within the scope of Atkins,
which applied federal law when the original action had been brought in
"another federal court." 50 It seems doubtful that the reasons given by'.
Atkins would support such an extension;51 thus, state law would probably
apply in this type of case.
III. CONCLUSION
The Virginia tolling law is less liberal than the federal law and the laws
of most other states. Since the Jones decision is judicially sound, it is the
task of the Virginia General Assembly to re-examine the purposes of statutes
of limitation, and to determine whether a change in the tolling law would
be desirable. Unless a change is made, a Virginia plaintiff must be careful'
to obtain proper venue and jurisdiction in his case if he wishes to avoid the
possibility of a second action being barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
J.W. T.
50The Atkins decision was based on federal institutional and policy considerations
favoring a unitary federal court system and the expeditious adjudication of cases on their
merits. Id. at 537. But whether these interests are sufficient to override the state's interest
in having its tolling law apply to actions initially brought in its courts is questionable.
The state's interest in having its tolling law apply is stronger in this type of factual
situation than it was in Atkins.
51 See notes 9 and 10 supra.
